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Scooter M. Hammer, Claimant,

Appeal No. 20080404-CA
Workforce Appeals Board No. 08B-00140

Respondents-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD, STATE OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES

Suzan Pixton
Attorney for Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244

Kevin R. Watkins (6355)
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P.O. Box 540700
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LIST OF PARTIES
All parties to this appeal and to the proceedings below are as follows:
(1) Hughes General Contractors. Petitioner and Appellant:
(2) Workforce Appeals Board, Department of Workforce Services of the State of
Utah, Appellee-Respondent;
(3) Scooter M. Hammer, Claimant.

LIST OF PARTIES
All parties to this appeal and to the proceedings below are listed in the case
caption.
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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35A-4508(8).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE #1:
Contrary to the decision of the Department of Workforce Services ("Department")
ALJ as affirmed by the Board, the decision of the ALJ is contrary to the stated purposes
of the Employment Security Act as set forth in Utah Code Annotated 35A-4-102;
ISSUE #2:
Contrary to the decision of the ALJ as affirmed by the Board, an employer has the
right to cure a termination prior to the expiration of a two-week notice period by paying
an employee in accordance with Utah Administrative Code ("UAC") Rule R994-405204.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES OR REGULATIONS
There are two determinative provisions of law and rule; the first is Utah Code
Annotated 35A-4-102, and the second is Utah Administrative Code ("UAC") Rule R994405-204. These two provisions are set forth below in their entirety.
35A-4-102. Public policy — General welfare requires creation of
unemployment reserves — Employment offices.
As a guide to the interpretation and application of this chapter, the public
policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to
unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people
4

of this state. Unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern
that requires appropriate action by the Legislature to prevent its spread and to
lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the
unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires
protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This objective can be
furthered by operating free public employment offices in affiliation with a nationwide system of employment services, by devising appropriate methods for
reducing the volume of unemployment and by the systematic accumulation of
funds during periods of employment from which benefits may be paid for periods
of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious
social consequences of unemployment. The Legislature, therefore, declares that in
its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of
this state require the enactment of this measure, under the police power of the
state, for the establishment and maintenance of free public employment offices
and for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the
benefit of unemployed persons.
R994-405-204. Quit or Discharge.
The circumstances of the separation as found by the Department determine
whether it was a quit or discharge. The conclusions on the employer's records, the
separation notice, or the claimant's report are not controlling.
(1) Discharge Before Effective Date of Resignation.
(a) Discharge.
If a claimant notifies the employer of an intent to leave work on a definite date,
and the employer ends the employment relationship prior to that date, the
separation is a discharge unless the claimant is paid through the resignation date.
Unless there is some other evidence of disqualifying conduct, benefits will be
awarded.
(b) Quit.
If the claimant gives notice of an intent to leave work on a particular date and is
paid regular wages through the announced resignation date, the separation is a quit
even if the claimant was relieved of work responsibilities prior to the effective
date of resignation. A separation is also a quit if a claimant announces an intent to
quit but agrees to continue working for an indefinite period, even though the date
of separation is determined by the employer. The claimant is not considered to
have quit merely by saying he or she is looking for a new job. If a claimant resigns
but later decides to stay and announces an intent to remain employed, the
reasonableness of the employer's refusal to continue the employment is the
primary factor in determining whether the claimant quit or was discharged. If the
employer had already hired a replacement, or had taken other action because of the
claimant's impending quit, it may not be practical for the employer to allow the
claimant to rescind the resignation, and it would be held the separation was a quit.
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(2) Leaving in Anticipation of Discharge.
If a claimant leaves work in anticipation of a possible discharge and if the reason
for the discharge would not have been disqualifying, the separation is a quit. A
claimant may not escape a disqualification under the discharge provisions,
Subsection 35A-4-405(2)(a), by quitting to avoid a discharge that would result in a
denial of benefits. In this circumstance the separation is considered a discharge.
(3) Refusal to Follow Instructions.
If the claimant refused or failed to follow reasonable requests or instructions, and
knew the loss of employment would result, the separation is a quit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal by the employer Petitioner of a decision of the Workforce
Appeals Board that affirmed an Administrative Law Judge's (UALJ") decision granting
unemployment benefits to Scooter M. Hammer (''Claimant"). (R 047.) The Department
of Workforce Services allowed benefits to the Claimant (R 013), the Petitioner appealed
that decision to an ALJ (R 014) who ruled in favor of the Department (R 031), and the
Workforce Appeals Board, as noted above, affirmed the decision of the ALJ (R 047).
The facts of the case are straightforward. On December 20, 2007, the Claimant
called his supervisor and stated that he needed to give two weeks notice of his intent to
quit his employment with the Petitioner (R 020). The Claimant was leaving his
employment with the Petitioner to accept a position with another employer (R 008, R
009). The following day the foreman spoke to the Claimant and stated to the Claimant
that because of the dearth of work over the holidays that the Claimant should end his
employment with the Petitioner immediately (R 021). The Petitioner did not pay the
Claimant through the proposed two-week notice period (R 029). After the Claimant filed
a claim with the Department of Workforce Services ("Department") the Petitioner asked
a Department representative if a payment for the two-week notice period could be paid
6

prior to the time the Department made a decision, and the Petitioner was told by the
representative that a payment could not be made (R 025).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The first argument of the Petitioner is simply that UAC Rule R994-405-204(l)(a)
("Rule") runs directly contrary to the Utah Employment Security Act ("Act") as set forth
in Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") 35A-4-102 because the Rule only benefits someone
who already has a job who of their own volition leaves that job. The Act, however, was
intended to address the "'economic insecurity" and associated deleterious effects on those
who by no fault of their own suffer the misfortunes of unemployment.
The second argument is that even if the Rule is deemed by this court to be
consistent with the policy of the Act, nothing in the Rule precludes the employer from
curing a termination prior to the end of a notice period after an employee makes a claim
for unemployment. The Petitioner in this case should have had the opportunity to cure its
"discharge" (id) of the Claimant after the Claimant filed his claim with the Department.
ARGUMENT
I. UAC RULE R994-405-204 (l)(a) IS CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSES
OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.
UAC Rule 994-405-204(1 )(a) only benefits those who are already employed but
choose to leave their employment and, therefore, is directly contrary to the stated purpose
of the State of Utah Employment Security Act ("Act"). As in this case, the Claimant
would not have suffered the insecurity and deleterious effects of unemployment because
he made the choice to submit a two-week notice of termination without any discussion
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with his employer in order to begin a job with another employer. (R 008.) But because
his employer, the Petitioner, ended the Claimant's employment prior to the expiration of
the two-week resignation notice period the Petitioner now benefits from a law intended
for those who do not have the choice to resign.
In the State of Utah the "primary purpose [of the Act] is to assist the worker and
his family in times when, without fault on his part, he is out of work." Kennecott Copper
Corp. Emp. v. Department of Employment Sec, of Indus. Commission 13 Utah 2d 262,
372 P.2d 987, (Utah 1962 ). (Emphasis added.) In this case, the Claimant was gainfully
employed by the Petitioner, but expressed his desire to no longer work for the Petitioner;
the Claimant provided the Petitioner with no other reason for leaving than that he desired
to accept a position with another employer. (R 008) Had the Claimant decided to stay he
may have continued to work for Hughes as long as he desired to do so. (R 022, Line 1.)
Traditionally, an employee submits a notice of his or her intention to resign for the
benefit of the employer in order for the employer to have sufficient time to replace the
resigning employee. It is, therefore, the Petitioner's position that an employee who
submits a notice of his or her intention to resign accepts the risk of termination prior to a
notice period. There is simply no statutory requirement that an employer must keep an
employee on its payroll, or pay him or her, when an employee decides they want to quit
their job, as was the case in this Appeal. The Department, however, has taken the
existing statute with its clear policy provisions stated by the Legislature to benefit only
those who have no choice about whether to keep their jobs, and brought those who do
have the choice to keep their jobs under the protection of the Act.
8

The Department, by adopting the Rule, has effectively created law that runs
contrary to state statute and, moreover, created bad public policy. The Rule grants
additional employment rights to an employee that is not grounded in legislation or
common law. The Department should simply not be allowed to create rules that go well
beyond the authority granted to it by the legislature, and by adopting R994-405-204
(1 )(a) the Department has done just that.
The Rule and its application in this case derogates from the very purpose for
which the Act was created, which is to "lighten [the] burden [of unemployment] which
now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family."
Utah Code Annotated 35A-4-102. As stated by Chief Justice Hall in 1982:
Clearly, the legislature's intent was to provide benefits to the unemployed,
but to restrict those benefits to a class of workers who become unemployed by no
fault of their own. Any application of the statute, or interpretation of the ordinary
meaning of its terms, should be consistent and reconcilable with this underlying
purpose. Although the act should be liberally construed, it does not follow that it
should be construed unrealistically or unreasonably, and certainly not so liberally
construed so as to defeat the very purpose of the act. West Jordan v. Morrison,
656 P.2d 445 (Utah 1982), Hall dissenting.
The cause of the Claimant leaving his employment with Hughes was his own
desire to resign in order accept a position with another employer. (R 008) The Claimant
did not object to his supervisor's suggestion that he leave his employment prior to his
designated resignation date (R 021), and but for his stated desire to leave his employment
with Hughes, the Claimant could have remained employed with Hughes. (R 022, line 1.)
The Act was not created for those who, like the Claimant no longer want to work. It was
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created for those who, "by no fault of their own " are involuntarily separated from their
Employment. (West Jordan v. Morrison. 656 P.2d 445 (Utah 1982), Hall dissenting.
The Act was not designed to protect the Claimant; he had a job with the Petitioner
that he intended to quit, and the Petitioner no longer needed him to stay an additional two
weeks if he wanted to work for someone else. This court should declare the Rule as
contrary to state statute and public policy, and the decision of the Board should be
overturned and the Claimant should be disqualified from receiving benefits because he
made the choice to resign from his employment with the Petitioner.
II. AN EMPLOYER HAS THE RIGHT TO CURE A TERMINATION
WITHIN THE PERIOD OF NOTICE OF RESIGNATION BY PAYING AN
EMPLOYEE AFTER HE OR SHE FILES A CLAIM WITH THE
DEPARTMENT.
The ALJ stated in his decision that "the rule does not allow the employer to cure
the discharge by paying the claimant through the two-week period after the claimant has
filed his claim for benefits." (R 030.) UAC R994-405-204, however, is silent as to
whether the employer's failure to pay the claimant after he or she files a claim can be
cured.
In the instant case, the employer was prepared to pay the claimant, but was
instructed by the Department not to do so until after it had made its initial decision. (R
023.) Because the question of payment through the alleged two-week notice given by the
claimant was never raised by the claimant at the time he was separated from his
employment, and because UAC R994-405-204 is silent on the matter, the Employer
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should be provided the opportunity to cure any such non-payment even after the
claimant's claim is or was filed with the Department.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments set forth above this court should declare that Rule
R994-405-204 (l)(a) is not authorized by statute and contrary to public policy and order
that the decision of the ALJ and the Board be reversed. In addition this Court should also
declare that the Petitioner has the right to cure a termination prior to the end of a stated
resignation period even after a claimant files a claim with the Department, and order that
this case be remanded to the Department in order for the Petitioner to make such a cure.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of October. 2008.

Attorney for Petitioner
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35A-4-102. Public policy — General welfare requires creation of
unemployment reserves — Employment offices.
As a guide to the interpretation and application of this chapter, the public
policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to
unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people
of this state. Unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern
that requires appropriate action by the Legislature to prevent its spread and to
lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the
unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires
protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This objective can be
furthered by operating free public employment offices in affiliation with a nationwide system of employment services, by devising appropriate methods for
reducing the volume of unemployment and by the systematic accumulation of
funds during periods of employment from which benefits may be paid for periods
of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious
social consequences of unemployment. The Legislature, therefore, declares that in
its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of
this state require the enactment of this measure, under the police power of the
state, for the establishment and maintenance of free public employment offices
and for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the
benefit of unemployed persons.
R994-405-204. Quit or Discharge.
The circumstances of the separation as found by the Department determine
whether it was a quit or discharge. The conclusions on the employer's records, the
separation notice, or the claimant's report are not controlling.
(1) Discharge Before Effective Date of Resignation.
(a) Discharge.
If a claimant notifies the employer of an intent to leave work on a definite date,
and the employer ends the employment relationship prior to that date, the
separation is a discharge unless the claimant is paid through the resignation date.
Unless there is some other evidence of disqualifying conduct, benefits will be
awarded.
(b) Quit.
If the claimant gives notice of an intent to leave work on a particular date and is
paid regular wages through the announced resignation date, the separation is a quit
even if the claimant was relieved of work responsibilities prior to the effective
date of resignation. A separation is also a quit if a claimant announces an intent to
quit but agrees to continue working for an indefinite period, even though the date
of separation is determined by the employer. The claimant is not considered to
have quit merely by saying he or she is looking for a new job. If a claimant resigns

but later decides to stay and announces an intent to remain employed, the
reasonableness of the employer's refusal to continue the employment is the
primary factor in determining whether the claimant quit or was discharged. If the
employer had already hired a replacement, or had taken other action because of the
claimant's impending quit, it may not be practical for the employer to allow the
claimant to rescind the resignation, and it would be held the separation was a quit.
(2) Leaving in Anticipation of Discharge.
If a claimant leaves work in anticipation of a possible discharge and if the reason
for the discharge would not have been disqualifying, the separation is a quit. A
claimant may not escape a disqualification under the discharge provisions,
Subsection 35A-4-405(2)(a), by quitting to avoid a discharge that would result in a
denial of benefits. In this circumstance the separation is considered a discharge.
(3) Refusal to Follow Instructions.
If the claimant refused or failed to follow reasonable requests or instructions, and
knew the loss of employment would result, the separation is a quit.
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WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

SCOOTER M. HAMMER, CLAIMANT
S.S.A. No.XXX-XX-1349

:
:

Case No. 08-B-00140

HUGHES GENERAL CONTRACTORS INC., :
EMPLOYER
DECISION OF W O R K F O R C E APPEALS BOARD:
The decision of the administrative law judge is affirmed.
Benefits are allowed.
The employer is not relieved of benefit charges.
H I S T O R Y OF CASE:
In a decision dated February 7,2008, Case No. 08-A-00218, the administrative law judge affirmed
the Department decision and allowed unemployment insurance benefits to the claimant effective
December 16, 2007. The employer, Hughes General Contractors Inc., was ineligible for relief of
benefit charges in connection with this claim.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the administrative law judge's decision
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto.
E M P L O Y E R APPEAL FILED: March 10, 2008.
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT:
1.

Did the employer have just cause for discharging the claimant pursuant to the provisions of
§35A-4-405(2)(a)?

2.

Is the employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-307(l) 9

FACTUAL FINDINGS:
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts m full the factual findings of the administrative law judge
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
On December 20, 2007, the claimant gave the employer two weeks notice of his intent to quit. The
claimant gave notice because he was to begin a new job on January 7, 2008. On December 21, 2007,
the day after the claimant gave his two weeks' notice, the employer told the claimant that because
of a slowdown in work, it would accept his resignation immediately and the claimant no longer
needed to report for work. The employer did not pay the claimant through the two week notice
period.
The claimant filed for unemployment benefits on December 21, 2007. The Department allowed
benefits and the employer appealed. After benefits were awarded, the employer called the
Department to ask if it could pay the claimant for the two week notice period and avoid paying for
unemployment. The employer's attorney testified during the hearing that he was told he could not
pay the claimant for the two weeks. On closer questioning, the attorney stated the Department told
him to wait until "we're through with this and we'll let you know." The attorney also admitted that
the Department did nothing to prevent the employer from paying the claimant. The attorney testified
because the Department did not contact him, he did not pay the claimant.
The Department's policy, which is consistent with its rules, is that if an employer lets the claimant
go prior to the expiration of the notice period and pays the claimant at the time, benefits will not be
awarded. The Department has consistently held, however, that the employer cannot attempt to cure
the problem by offering to pay, or paying, the claimant at a later date.
Department rules provide:
R994-405-106.
(6)

Quit or Discharge.

Resignation Intended.
(a)

Quit.

If a claimant gives notice of his or her intent to leave at a future date and is
paid regular wages through the announced resignation date, the separation is a quit
even if the claimant was relieved of work responsibilities prior to the effective date
of the resignation. A separation is also a quit if a claimant announces an intent to
quit but agrees to continue working for an indefinite period as determined by the
employer, even though the date of separation was determined by the employer. If a
claimant resigns but later decides to stay and attempts to remain employed, the
reasonableness of the employer's refusal to continue the employment is the primary
factor m determining if the claimant quit or was discharged. For example, if the
employei had already hired a replacement, or taken other action because of the
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claimant's impending quit, it may not be practical for the employer to allow the
claimant to rescind the resignation, and the separation is a quit.
(b)

Discharge.

If a claimant submitted a resignation to be effective at a definite future
date, but was relieved of work responsibilities and was not paid regular wages
through the balance of the notice period, the separation is considered a
discharge as the employer was the moving party in determining the final date
of employment. Merely assigning vacation pay not previously assigned to the notice
period does not make the separation a quit, [emphasis supplied]
In West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P 2d 445, (Utah 1982), the claimant gave the employer a letter of
resignation on November 26, 1980, The letter stated his last day of work would be December 10,
1980. The employer told the claimant it was accepting his resignation as of the date of the
resignation letter, November 26,1980. The employer would not allow the claimant to work through
the notice period and did not pay the claimant through the notice period.
The court relied, for its ruling, on Utah Code subsection 35-4-5(a). That provision has been
renumbered and is now subsection 35A-4-405(l) which reads:
35A-4-405. Ineligibility for benefits.
Except "as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), an individual is ineligible for
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(1) (a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good
cause, if so found by the division, and for each week thereafter until the claimant has
performed services in bona fide, covered employment and earned wages for those
services equal to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount.
(b) A claimant may not be denied eligibility for benefits if the claimant leaves
work under circumstances where it would be contrary to equity and good conscience
to impose a disqualification.
(c) Using available information from employers and the claimant, the division
shall consider for the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's
actions, and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment
to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility of a
claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience.
The employer in West Jordan argued that the claimant in that case should be ineligible for
unemployment benefits after December 10, 1980, the date he would have left had the employer not
discharged him effective November 26, 1980. The court held.

08-B-00140

-4-

XXX-XX-1349
SCOOTER M. HAMMER

The employer asserts that because the claimant would have left work voluntarily on
December 10 anyway, his eligibility a month later should not be affected by the
employer's decision to make the resignation effective immediately. The employer
urges an interpretation of § 35-4-5(a) which would state, in effect, "An individual
shall be ineligible for benefits.... for [any] week in which the claimant left work
voluntarily without good cause . . . . and for each week thereafter . ..." Id
(Emphasis added.) In other words, the employer would have us consider the week in
which the claimant offered to resign without regard for the week in which he actually
left work.
We have frequently stated that this Court's primary responsibility in construing
legislative enactments is to give effect to the Legislature's underlying intent. See,
e.g.. Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., Utah, 609 P.2d934 (1980). We have also said that
a statute should be applied according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably
confused or inoperable. See Cord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P. 2d 449
(1967). We must assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly by the
Legislature and that each should be interpreted and applied according to its usually
accepted meaning. Where the ordinary meaning of the terms results in an application
that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction to the
express purpose of the statute, it is not the duty of this Court to assess the wisdom of
the statutory scheme, See, e.g., Knox v. Thomas, 30 Utah 2d 15, 512 P.2d 664
(1973)\ Gord, supra.
With these principles in mind, we hold that the ordinary meaning of the terms does
not support the interpretation advanced by the employer. It is clear that the purpose
of § 35-4-5 is to set out various conditions under which a claimant is ineligible for
benefits. One of these conditions is the voluntary departure from employment
without good cause. By its wording, the statute directs our attention to the week in
which the claimant left work-not the week that he might have left work, or offered
to leave work, but the week in which the claimant actually left work. There is no
question that the claimant left work the week of November 26, 1979, and that his
leaving that week was not voluntary.
In this case, the claimant left work on December 21, 2007. The employer determined when the
claimant's employment was to end. During the hearing the employer's witnesses testified the
claimant was let go on December 21 because it was a slow period for the employer and since the
claimant announced his intention to quit in two weeks anyway, the employer just let him go early.
Under the statute and the rules, it is the week when the job separation occurred that is used to
determine the reason for the separation, On December 21, 2007, the employer discharged the
claimant without just cause oi laid him off due to a reduction in force. The claimant did not know
announcing his intent to quit in two weeks would result in his early discharge. Because the
knowledge prong of the just cause test has not been proved, the control element is not present either.
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Because the claimant did not know what the consequences of his actions would be, he could not
conform his behavior to the employer's demands. The employer did not prove culpability. None of
the elements of just cause were proved.
When the claimant filed his claim for benefits, the employer was contacted to provide information
about the separation. The employer was sent an "Official Notice of Claim Filed" form. The form
is a fill in the blank form. The employer filled out the form stating the claimant quit and was "not
required by us to work through end of [sic] week." The initial adjudicator contacted the employer
by telephone. A representative of the employer company told the adjudicator that because work is
slow for the employer it decided to let the claimant leave early "rather than give him busy work."
At no time did the employer state in the initial adjudication phase that it wanted to pay the claimant
through the two week notice period.
It is assumed, from the record, that it was only after the employer was notified the claimant was
awarded benefits that the employer asked if it could pay the claimant through the notice period.
Although the employer's witness testified the Department told the employer it could not pay the
claimant through the notice period, this may have been a misunderstanding. The Department has
consistently held that payment after the claim is filed and the initial determination is made cannot
cure the problem. It is more likely that the employer was told paying the claimant through the notice
period at that late date would not change the Department's decision.
The employer's argument that it should be allowed to pay the claimant through the notice period now
and be relieved of its obligation to pay charges on the unemployment claim is not persuasive.
Determining the cause of a job separation looks to the facts as existed at the time of the separation.
Department of Labor standards currently require that the initial decision be made within two weeks
of the date when the claim is filed. Because of this time frame, and the fact that the decision is made
based on the facts at the time the separation occurred, the Department does not consider any actions
taken by a party after the separation occurs.
Unemployment compensation is a program operated by a state federal partnership. If a state does
not follow federal regulations in paying unemployment benefits, employers in that state are required
to pay a different, and higher, federal unemployment insurance rate. By agreeing to abide by the
federal regulations, Utah employers pay a lower unemployment tax rate.
42 U.S.C. §503 provides:
(a) Provisions required. The Board [Secretary of Labor] shall make no certification
for payment to any State unless it finds that the law of such State, approved by the
Board Secretary of Labor under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, includes
piovision for-
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(1) Such methods of administration (including after January 1, 1940, methods
relating to the establishment and maintenance of personnel standards on a merit
basis, except that the Board [Secretary of Labor] shall exercise no authority with
respect to the selection, tenure of office, and compensation of any individual
employed in accordance with such methods) as are found by the Board [Secretary of
Labor] to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment
compensation when due;.. .
That section was interpreted by the U. S. Supreme Court in California Dep't of Human Resource
Development v Java, 402 U.S. 121, (1971). The claimants in Java were initially found eligible for
unemployment benefits and the employers appealed. Under California law at the time,
unemployment benefits immediately ceased pending the employers' appeal. When their benefits
stopped, the claimants initiated a class action claiming the California statute in question was
unconstitutional and a violation of 42 USC 503(1).
The U.S. Supreme Courtunanimouslyupheld the lower court's finding that the California statute was
unconstitutional and violated 42 USC 503(1). In so holding the court noted that the system for
determining eligibility in California at the time was that when a claimant filed a claim for benefits,
an interview was scheduled with an eligibility interviewer. The interview was scheduled for three
weeks after the claim was filed. In those three weeks, the interviewer gathered information from
both parties. Both parties were given notice of the interview and invited to participate. The
claimant's eligibility was determined at that interview and notice of the decision was sent to the
claimant and the employer.
[T]he interview for the determination of eligibility is the critical point in the
California procedure. In the Department's own terms, it is "the point at which any
issue affecting the claimant's eligibility is decided and fulfills the Department's legal
obligation to insure that... benefits are paid promptly if claimant is eligible" L. O,
M. § 1400.1 (1) (emphasis added). If the initial determination is favorable to the
claimant, payments begin immediately, and for 95-98% of the claims, former
employers do not appear or seek a hearing; no further problem arises as to initial
eligibility. The Department sends out a notice to the employer informing him [sic]
that the claimant has been found eligible, and that the employer may appeal within
10 days. Cal Unemp. Ins Code § 1328, . . .
If the employer appeals, payment of the claimant's benefits is stopped pending
determination on appeal before an Appeals Board Referee. Id., § 1335] see L. O. M.
§ 1474. The automatic suspension of benefits upon the employer's appeal, after an
initial determination of eligibility, is the aspect of the California procedure
challenged here. By that time the claimant may have received one or perhaps two
payments When the employer appeals, a hearing is then scheduled at which both the
parties may appear and be represented, call witnesses, and present evidence "A
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referee after affording a reasonable opportunity for fair hearing, shall, unless such
appeal is withdrawn, affirm, reverse, or modify any determination which is appealed
. . , ." Cctl. Unemp. Ins Code § 1334. The appeal affords a de novo consideration.
Generally, processing of the employer's appeal takes between six and seven weeks,
between the date of filing the appeal and the date of mailing the decision or
dismissal.
If upon appeal the Referee finds the claimant eligible, payments are reinstated at
once and continue even if the employer exercises his right to appeal further to the
Appeals Board. Cal Unemp. Ins. Code § 1335 (b). Meanwhile as much as seven to
10 weeks may have elapsed. The record indicates that employers are successful in
less than 50% of their appeals from initial determinations of eligibility.
The dispositive issue is the determination of whether § 1335 of the California
Unemployment Insurance Code violates the command of 42 U S. C § 503 (a)(1) that
state unemployment compensation programs must "bereasonably calculated to insure
full payment of unemployment compensation when due." The purpose of the federal
statutory scheme must be examined in order to reconcile the apparent conflict
between the provision of the California statute and § 303 (a)(1) of the Social Security
Act.
It is true, as appellants argue, that the unemployment compensation insurance
program was not based on need in the sense underlying the various welfare programs
that had their genesis in the same period of economic stress a generation ago. A kind
of "need" is present in the statutory scheme for insurance, however, to the extent that
any "salary replacement" insurance fulfills a need caused by lost employment. The
objective of Congress was to provide a substitute for wages lost during a period of
unemployment not the fault of the employee. Probably no program could be devised
to make insurance payments available precisely on the nearest payday following the
termination, but to the extent that this was administratively feasible this must be
regarded as what Congress was trying to accomplish. The circumstances surrounding
the enactment of the statute confirm this.
We conclude that the word "due" in § 303 (a)(1), when construed in light of the
purposes of the Act, means the time when payments arefirstadministratively allowed
as a result of a hearing of which both parties have notice and are permitted to present
their respective positions; any other construction would fail to meet the objective of
early substitute compensation during unemployment.

08-B-00140

- 8-

XXX-XX-1349
SCOOTER M. HAMMER

It would frustrate one of the Act's basic purposes -- providing a "substitute" for wages
- to permit an employer to ignore the initial interview or fail to assert and document
a claimed defense, and then effectuate cessation of payments by asserting a defense
to the claim by way of appeal. If the employer fails to present any evidence, he has
in effect defaulted, and neither he nor the State can with justification complain if, on
a prima facie showing, benefits are allowed. If the employer's defenses are not
accepted and the claim is allowed, that also constitutes a determination that the
benefits are "due."
The facts in this case are different from the facts in Java but the same principles apply.
Unemployment benefits must be paid when due and here those benefits were due when the
separation occurred, December 21,2007. The decision is made based on the facts at the time of the
job separation. If either party were allowed to effectively change those facts, it would make it
impossible for either party to know when a final decision had been made. While it is true the
employer here attempted to cure the problem before the hearing before the administrative law judge,
if the Department allowed such action, it would not be making its decision based on "the week in
which the claimant left work" but on some later date. If that were allowed, it would have to be
determined how long a party had to cure the problem. Under those circumstances, a claimant would
never know if his benefits would continue.
There is an additional problem in this case. The claimant testified he gave notice of his intent to quit
because he was to start a new job on January 7,2008. Given those facts, the claimant may have had
good cause to quit. Evidence was not taken to establish good cause because it was determined the
claimant did not quit but was discharged. But, if the employer were allowed to pay the claimant
some time after the decision is made, the Department would have to start over and evaluate the claim
in terms of a quit.
Judicial and administrative economy requires that decisions reach finality at some point. If either
party were allowed to effectively change the facts, as the employer requests here, finality would be
an illusion. The Department bases its decision on the facts as existed "the week in which the
claimant left work," The employer's argument is without merit.
The reasoning and conclusions of law of the administrative law judge are adopted in full.
DECISION:

The decision of the administrative law judge allowing unemployment insurance benefits to the
claimant effective December 16, 2007, under the provisions of §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah
Employment Security Act is affirmed.
The employer, Hughes General Contractors Inc . is ineligible for relief of benefit charges in
connection with this claim as provided by §35A-4-307(kl J of the act.
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APPEAL RIGHTS:
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(1 )(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to
each party by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered
to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order. If a
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision. This
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for
such an appeal.
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board',
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk.of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment
Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9
and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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